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I. INTRODUCTION
In our complex society consumers increasingly rely upon the expertise of
the manufacturers and retailers of consumer goods. This reliance has in part
led to the adoption in many jurisdictions of some form of strict products
liability.' In a growing number of.jurisdictions this heightened liability of
manufacturers has been coupled with the application of the doctrine of puni-
tive damages.- The award of punitive damages in strict products liability cases
has raised a chorus of protests from the industrial community, legal commen-
tators , and defense attorneys. Many important theoretical and policy issues
have been raised, but unfortunately the reported cases have not always
thoroughly examined the relevant issues. Two recent state supreme court
opinions offer excellent vehicles for a discussion of the issues that arise when
an award of punitive damages is requested in a strict products liability case. In
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.4 and Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.,5 the Wiscon-
sin and Minnesota Supreme Courts respectively held that punitive damages
could be awarded in strict products liability cases.
This Comment will examine the functions of a punitive damages award,
the theoretical and practical problems of awarding punitive damages in strict
liability cases, and the standard of culpability that must be shown before
punitive damages will be imposed. Attention will also be given to defenses
that defendants have attempted to raise when threatened with the prospect of
punitive damages. The Comment will suggest that punitive damages awards
play a proper and an important role in strict products liability litigation. The
Comment will acknowledge, however, that changes are needed in the applica-
tion of the doctrine in order to achieve the goals the doctrine of punitive
damages is designed to advance.
II. THE DOCTRINE
A. Historical Background
The doctrine of punitive damages6 is an ancient one with .historical
origins predating the English common law.7 Punitive damages were recog-
1. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 98 (4th ed. 1971).
2. See appendix for a list of those jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of allowing punitive damages
awards in strict products liability cases.
3. See, e.g., Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Outline, I1
FORUM 57 (1975); Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products Liability, 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 300 (1972).
4. 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
5. - Minn. - , 297 N.W.2d 727, cert. denied sub nom. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 449
U.S. 941 (1980).
6. The term "punitive damages" will be used throughout this paper. The labels of "exemplary," "vindic-
tive," and "smart money" have also been used to describe these damage awards. See K. REDDEN, PUNrIVE
DAMAGES § 2.1 (1980).
7. Mosaic Law recognized multiple or punitive type damages. One example of punitive damages would
be: "If a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for an ox, and four
sheep for a sheep." Exodus 22:1 (King James).
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nized in England as early as 1278 with the enactment of the Statute of
Gloucester,8 which awarded treble damages to an injured party for waste. The
term "exemplary damages" was first used in the case of Huckle v. Money.9 In
that case punitive damages were allowed because of the need to take into
account the "most daring public attack made upon the liberty of the subject"
through entry and imprisonment pursuant to a nameless warrant.'0
Blackstone made numerous references to the award of punitive damages in
situations that required special deterrents."
From England the doctrine of punitive damages was transported to
America.12 Later cases articulated numerous rationales for allowing punitive
damages, including compensating for the cost of deserving litigation when
only small compensatory damages could be expected, 3 redressing affronts to
personal feelings that are not susceptible of measurement, 4 satisfying the
desire for revenge in order to help preserve the public peace by offering
an attractive alternative to self-help, 5 and serving as punishment for and
deterrence of socially disapproved conduct. 6 By 1851 the doctrine of punitive
damages had become so established and accepted in the United States that the
United States Supreme Court even noted in dicta that it could not be argued
that punitive damages awards were improper. 17 Today, however, numerous
commentators are questioning the application of this doctrine to strict products
liability cases on the basis of theoretical and policy considerations.'8
B. Legal Standard of Liability
Punitive damages can be awarded only if a plaintiff is first able to show
that the defendant is liable for compensatory damages.' 9 In the strict products
liability context this normally means that the elements of Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts have been proved.20 Once this burden is
8. 6 Edw. I, c.5 (1278).
9. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
10. Id.
11. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 88-89,118-19,146-47,210-11 (1st
ed. 1768).
12. See Genay v. Norris, I S.C.L. (I Bay) 3 (1784) (the first reported punitive damages decision in the
United States). See also Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 371 (1851) (dictum).
13. E.g., New Orleans, J. & G.N.R.R. v. Allbiitton, 38 Miss. 242, 272-73 (1859). See generally Morris,
Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1931); Morris, Rough Justice and Some Utopian
Ideas, 24 ILL. L. REV. 730 (1930).
14. See Tullidge v. Wade, 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (1769).
15. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 522-23 (1957).
16. E.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1896); Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th (tir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church, 262 N.Y. 320, 186 N.E. 793 (1933).
17. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 371 (1851).
18. See note 3 supra.
19. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (4th ed. 1971).
20. Section 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
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met, the plaintiff must still show that there has been something more than the
mere commission of a tort.2' Exactly what conduct must be shown is not
always clear. A brief discussion of the legal standard of liability and the type
of conduct generally found in strict products liability cases that have awarded
punitive damages should give some order to the confusion.
To recover an award of punitive damages, a plaintiff must prove that "the
defendant's misconduct was so flagrant as to require a more severe monetary
imposition than would result from an award of nominal or compensatory
damages alone.'"- The focus of this inquiry is on the mental state of the
defendant. 23 Jurisdictions differ in the language used to describe the legal
standard of culpability needed to justify an award of punitive damages. In
California it must be shown that the defendant was guilty of oppression,
fraud, or malice, express or implied.24 Michigan requires that the defendant's
act be "wanton, willful, malicious, oppressive, very grossly negligent, vindic-
tive, aggravated, or in reckless disregard of the rights or safety of the plain-
tiff.'"'2 Minnesota awards punitive damages when the plaintiff shows by
"clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show a willful
indifference to the rights or safety of others.
26
The Model Uniform Products Liability Act summarizes the various
terminology employed by the different jurisdictions. Section 129(A) states:
"Punitive damages may be awarded to the claimant if the claimant proves by
clear and convincing evidence that the harm suffered was the result of the
product seller's reckless disregard for the safety of product users, consumers,
or others who might be harmed by the product." 27 The term "reckless dis-
regard" is defined as "a conscious indifference to the safety of persons or
entities that might be harmed by a product. 28 This term denotes aggravated
conduct that represents a major departure from ordinary negligence. 29
In accord with the agency relationship implicit in strict products liability
cases, the majority of jurisdictions hold that "a corporation is liable for puni-
tive damages for the wanton misconduct of all employees who are acting
within the general scope of their employment." 30 This standard has become
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation
with the seller.
21. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (4th ed. 1971).
22. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 3.1(A) (1980).
23. Id.
24. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1981).
25. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 5.2(A) (22) (1980).
26. MINN. SrAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West Supp. 1981).
27. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,748 (1979).
28. Id. at 62,717-18.
29. Id. at 62,720.
30. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (4th ed. 1971); K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES § 4.14 (1980).
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known as the "vicarious liability rule."'" An additional showing is required in
a number of jurisdictions that have adopted the "complicity rule, ' 32 under
which corporations are liable for punitive damages only when it has been
shown that a highly placed employee ordered, participated in, or ratified the
misconduct claimed to have been in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights.
While the exact terminology may differ from case to case, as a general
rule, punitive damages will be awarded in a strict products liability case only
when there has been a showing of malice or willful, wanton, or reckless action
in disregard of the rights of others.33
Four factors consistently appear in the reported cases that have addressed
the question of punitive damages in strict products liability actions. First,
the cases generally find some corporate knowledge of the danger posed by the
design of the product. 34 Second, the cases reveal knowledge by corporate
agents that the defect has caused injuries to persons other than the person
involved in the present litigation.35 Third, there is generally some sort of
procrastination on the part of the corporation in remedying the defect or in
warning the public of the defect. 36 Finally, a number of cases note that alter-
native designs would have been economically feasible.37 In addition to these
factors, a number of the reported cases have involved fraudulent behavior on
the part of the defendants. 38 For courts to find that a particular defendant's
behavior satisfies the legal standards of liability set out above, however,
combinations of two or more of these factors must be present.
While the terminology employed by the courts lacks precision, the
awards of punitive damages have been restricted to cases in which the defen-
dant's conduct has clearly fallen into the category of disapproved behavior.
Manufacturers who have not engaged in the types of conduct described and
who do not intend to engage in such activity have no legitimate reason for
fearing possible punitive liability.
C. The Functions of a Punitive Damages Award
As noted earlier, numerous theories have historically been used to justify
the awarding of punitive damages. Early cases often sought to characterize
punitive damages as some form of compensation. Mental suffering, because
of the difficulty of setting a monetary award, was cited as one injury that
punitive damages could compensate.39 Punitive damages were also seen as
31. See note 30 supra.
32. Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIO Sr. L.J. 216, 221 (1960).
33. E.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.,
Minn. -, 297 N.W.2d 727 (1980).
34. E.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
35. E.g., Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., - Minn. __, 297 N.W.2d 727 (1980).
36. Id. See also Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976);
Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. App. 1978).
37. E.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979).
38. E.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
39. See Stuart v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 66 Tex. 580, 586, 18 S.W. 351, 353 (1885).
[Vol. 42:771
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
compensation for indignities forced upon the plaintiff,40 insults, and other
noncompensable injuries.4'
A second early theory used to justify punitive damages awards posited
that they served to punish the defendant for his outrageous behavior.42 This
function of punitive damages was deemed appropriate when no criminal
remedy was available,43 when the criminal remedy was inadequate, 44 or when
punishment was deemed necessary to quench the individual plaintiff's or
society's thirst for revenge.
There was also an early recognition that punitive damages awards served
as a means of deterring the wrongdoer and others from behaving in the same
manner in the future. 46 This deterrent function was eloquently illustrated by
the court in Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railway.47
A corporation is an imaginary being .... All its schemes of mischief, as well as its
schemes of public enterprise, are conceived by human minds and executed by
human hands .... [U]nder cover of its name and authority, there is in fact
as ... much that is deserving of punishment, as can be found anywhere else. And
since these ideal existences can neither be hung, imprisoned, whipped or put in the
stocks,-since in fact no corrective influence can be brought to bear upon them
except that of pecuniary loss,-it does seem to us that the doctrine of exemplary
damages is more beneficial in its application to them than in its application to
natural persons .... [I]f the courts will only let the verdicts of upright and intelli-
gent juries alone, and let the doctrine of exemplary damages have its legitimate
influence, we predict these great and growing evils will be very much lessened, if
not entirely cured. There is but one vulnerable point about these ideal existences,
called corporations; and that is, the pocket of the monied power that is concealed
behind them; and if that is reached, they will wince. When it is thoroughly under-
stood that it is not profitable to employ careless and indifferent agents, or reckless
and insolvent agents, better men will take their places, and not before.
48
The functions of punitive damages awards in strict products liability liti-
gation are generally described as punishment and deterrence.49 While not
mentioned in the reported cases dealing with punitive damages in strict
products liability litigation, Professor Owen forcefully argues that punitive
40. Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
41. See K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(C) (1980); Freifield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages,
I OHIO Sr. L.J. 5, 7 (1935).
42. Freifield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages, I OHIO Sr. L.J. 5, 6-7 (1935). See also Simpson v.
McCaffrey, 13 Ohio St. 509, 522 (1844).
43. See Hopkins v. Atlantic & St. Lawrence R.R., 36 N.H. 2, 9 (1857); Atlantic & Great W. Ry. v. Dunn,
19 Ohio St. 162, 172 (1869); Freifield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages, 1 OHIO Sr. L.J. 5, 7-8 (1935).
44. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(E) (1980); Freifield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages, 1
OHIO ST. L.J. 5, 9 (1935).
45. K. REDDEN, PUNITIvE DAMAGES § 2.2(F) (1980).
46. Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814); Tullidge v. Wade, 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (C.P. 1769); K.
REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(D) (1980).
47. 57 Me. 202 (1869).
48. Id. at 223-24.
49. E.g., Gillhamn v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Sturm,
Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38,47 (Alaska 1979); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d260, 294 N.W.2d 437
(1980).
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damages also serve a valuable compensatory function in products liability
cases.
50
A fourth function of punitive damages in products liability litigation has
been termed law enforcement.5' Professor Owen argues that the prospects of
a large punitive damages award may induce a plaintiff to act as a private
attorney general, thus exposing the manufacturer's misconduct.52 Professor
Owen also sees the punitive damages award as a way of implementing the
rules of substantive law that society for various reasons would be unable to
enforce. 53 This law enforcement function appears to be in part an extension of
the deterrence function and has been implicitly recognized by some courts:"
Finally, the threat of punitive damages awards is often used as a settle-
ment tool in products liability litigation.55 This tactical function has been
described in attorneys' practice manuals56 and is well known to products
liability and personal injury litigators.
III. THE DEBATE
A. Two Factual Frameworks
1. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.
On July 1, 1975, Robin DuVall was driving a 1967 Ford Mustang. While
she was stopped at an intersection, a second car ran into the rear end of her
Mustang, pushing it into the opposite lane of travel. The Mustang was then
struck by another car and the Mustang's fuel tank ruptured. A fire ensued,
and Robin and her three passengers were severely injured. Two of the pas-
sengers eventually died as a result of their injuries. 57
Lawsuits were commenced against a number of defendants, including
Ford Motor Company (hereinafter Ford). Both compensatory and punitive
damages were sought against Ford. The claim for compensatory damages
against Ford was based on Ford's alleged negligence in design, manufacture,
assembly, sale, and distribution of the 1967 Mustang. The claim was also
based on the theory of Ford's strict liability in tort for the sale of the 1967
Mustang in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the users.8
50. Owen, Punitive Damages in the Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1295-99 (1976).
He believes that the costs of bringing a lawsuit not covered by compensatory damages would be covered by a
punitive damages award.
51. Id. at 1287. See also Abramson, Punitive Damages in Aircraft Accident Cases-A Debate, It FORUII
50, 51-52 (1975).
52. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1287-88 (1976).
53. Id. at 1288-95.
54. E.g., Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., - Minn. 297 N.W.2d 727, 733 (1980).
55. See DuBois, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury, Products Liability and Professional Malpractice
Cases: Bonanza or Disaster, 43 INS. COUNSEL J. 344, 350 (1976).
56. See C. ROBBINS, ATTORNEY'S MASTER GUIDE TO EXPEDITING TOP-DOLLAR CASE SETTLEMENTS
223-25, 716 (1975).
57. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 263, 294 N.W.2d 437, 440 (1980).
58. Id.
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Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages was based on allegations that
Ford knew that the fuel tanks on this and other 1%7 Mustangs were dangerously
defective before and after the manufacture of the car in question; that corrective
design changes were made in [later] models ... ; that Ford failed to warn users of
the car of the potential danger... ; that Ford failed to recall, repair or modify the
defective vehicles ... in order to avoid [expenses and lost sales]; and that Ford's
conduct... constituted intentional, deliberate, reckless, willful, wanton, gross,
callous, malicious and fraudulent disregard for the safety of users of Ford's
product.
59
Ford moved to dismiss all allegations relating to punitive damages on the
grounds that the complaints for punitive damages failed to state a claim
against the defendant upon which relief could be granted. The trial court
denied Ford's motion. On review the court of appeals, in an unpublished
decision, concluded that punitive damages could be recovered under some of
the plaintiffs' complaints but not under othersi6
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held:
[T]he complaints state a claim for (1) punitive damages in the products liability
action predicated on negligence or strict liability in tort; (2) punitive damages in the
action which survives the death of the injured person; (3) punitive damages in the
actions by the parents for damages for loss of society and companionship of a child
and for loss of the minor's earning capacity and medical expenses. We further hold
that the complaints fail to state a claim for punitive damages in the wrongful death
action.
61
The case was then remanded to the circuit court, where Ford will have to
defend against the punitive damages claims when the case comes to trial.
2. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.
Lee Ann Gryc, a four year old, was wearing pajamas made from a cotton
material manufactured by Riegel Textile Corporation. Lee Ann heard the
stove timer and walked to the kitchen to turn it off. As she reached across the
stove her pajama top came in contact with a lighted burner and ignited. The
pajama top was immediately engulfed in flames and burned for eight to twelve
seconds before Lee Ann's mother could extinguish the flames. Lee Ann was
severely burned and suffered permanent disfigurement.62
The type of fabric manufactured by the defendant was the fabric pre-
dominantly used in children's winter sleepwear at the time of the accident.
The fabric was not treated with any flame retardant, even though products
were available that could reduce the flammability of the fabric. Although the
flammable characteristics of the fabric were well known to the defendant, no
59. Id. at 263-64, 294 N.W.2d at 440.
60. Id. at 264, 294 N.W.2d at 441.
61. Id. at 319, 294 N.W.2d at 466-67.
62. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., - Mim .... 297 N.W.2d 727, 729-30 (1980), cert.
denied sub nom., Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 449 U.S. 921 (1980).
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warning was given of these characteristics to either the retailers or the ulti-
mate consumers of the product.63
The evidence adduced at trial established that (1) thousands of people
had died from or had been seriously injured by clothing fires involving highly
flammable fabrics; (2) the defendant knew of the flammability hazard, six
cases having been brought against it for accidents involving the same fabric;
and (3) the defendant's efforts in the flame retardant field were minimal,
considering that it spent less than ten percent of its research funds on the
development of nonflammable products. 64 Evidence also showed that a
national standard for determining fabric flammability had been promulgated
and that the defendant's fabric passed this test. It was also shown at trial that
the textile industry had been instrumental in having so weak a federal flam-
mability standard adopted. 65
The jury found the defendant manufacturer liable on a theory of strict
liability and awarded Lee Ann $750,000 in compensatory damages and
$1,000,000 in punitive damages. On appeal the Supreme Court of Minnesota
affirmed the awards. The court held that punitive damages may be awarded in
an appropriate strict liability case.66 The court also determined that the defen-
dant's compliance with an applicable federal safety standard did not preclude
a punitive damages award as a matter of law. 67
Both the Wangen court and the Gryc court joined the growing number of
courts expressly recognizing that punitive damages may be awarded in a strict
products liability case. Unlike so many of the other courts, the Wangen court
thoroughly addressed the arguments against allowing punitive damages in the
strict products liability context. The Gryc court, however, chose to rely upon
the fact that several jurisdictions have upheld punitive awards in strict prod-
ucts liability casesj8 and that the purposes of punitive damages could be
realized in a strict products liability case.6 These bootstrap references to
other decisions offer no support for the Gryc court's own position. An objec-
tive, thoughtful analysis should not rely upon the number of courts that have
allowed or disallowed punitive damages. Instead, each court should review
for itself the validity of the policies behind punitive damages awards and the
theoretical and practical ramifications of allowing punitive awards. Only
when the issue is approached in that manner can the arguments against award-
ing punitive damages in strict products liability cases be countered. 70 Fortu-
nately, the Wangen court took such an approach.
63. Id. at ____ 297 N.W.2d at 730-31.
64. Id. at ____ 297 N.W.2d at 739-40.
65. Id. at __, 297 N.W.2d at 733-34.
66. Id. at __, 297 N.W.2d at 733.
67. Id. at __, 297 N.W.2d at 733-35.
68. Id. at __, 297 N.W.2d at 732.
69. Id. at __, 297 N.W.2d at 733.
70. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967) (dictum).
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The attacks leveled upon punitive damages in strict products liability
cases have basically fallen into three categories: 71 (1) arguments that the
doctrine of punitive damages itself is an anomaly in the civil law and that its
functions should be left to the criminal law;7 (2) arguments that the no-fault
doctrine of strict liability is theoretically incompatible with the fault-based
punitive damages doctrine;73 and (3) arguments that policy considerations
weigh heavily against punitive damages in the strict products liability con-
text.74 Each of these categories of arguments will be considered in turn.
B. Punitive Damages as an Infringement on the Criminal Law
The two most widely accepted functions of punitive damages, punish-
ment and deterrence, are also two of the functions underlying the criminal
law. 75 It is argued that the punishment function of the criminal law is the
characteristic that most distinguishes it from civil law.76 Applying the doctrine
of punitive damages in strict products liability cases, or in any civil case, is
said to "corrupt the distinction between the civil and criminal law while
permitting a lesser burden of proof for imposing the penalties."77 If the defen-
dant is prosecuted under criminal sanctions for his conduct, he would be
subjected to a form of double jeopardy.78 Additionally, the doctrine of puni-
tive damages does not provide the defendant with other constitutional safe-
guards afforded in criminal proceedings.79
In Fay v. Parker,8° an early New Hampshire case, Justice Foster ex-
pressed reservations about imposing punitive damages liability in civil cases:
How could the idea of punishment be deliberately and designedly installed as a
doctrine of civil remedies? Is not punishment out of place, irregular, anomalous,
exceptional, unjust, unscientific, not to say absurd and ridiculous, when classed
among civil remedies? What kind of a civil remedy for the plaintiff is the punish-
71. A fourth category involves challenges that argue that the imposition of punitive damages violates
constitutional due process guarantees in that there are no adequate standards for awarding punitive damages and
that the doctrine is arbitrarily applied. Thus, the defendant is denied fair warning. Similar arguments have been
used against the negligence doctrine and have been rejected. While the standard could be made more concrete,
this argument is no basis upon which to repudiate the doctrine of punitive damages. See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v.
Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46 (Alaska 1979); K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 7.2(B) (1980).
72. See, e.g., Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Outline, 11
FORUM 57 (1975); Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REV.
408 (1967).
73. See, e.g., Haskell, The Aircraft Manufacturer's Liability for Design and Punitive Damages-The
Insurance Policy and the Public Policy, 40 J. AIR L. & COM. 595 (1974); Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products
Liability, 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 300 (1972).
74. See note 73 supra. See also Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-50 (2d Cit. 1967);
Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870, 886 (1976).
75. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 17-61 (1968).
76. Id.
77. Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages:An AnnotatedArgumentative Outline, II FORUM 57,58
(1975).
78. Id. See also Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REV.
408, 413-17 (1967).
79. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 330, 294 N.W.2d 437, 472 (1980) (Coffey, J., dissenting
opinion); Fulton, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Cases, 15 FORUM 117 (1979).
80. 53 N.H. 342 (1873).
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ment of the defendant? The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an
unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of
law. 81
The answer to these valid arguments is threefold. First, punishment and
deterrence are not historically unique functions of the criminal law. English
common law has long recognized that punishment may be inflicted in the
course of civil actions.8 2 Second, because the consequences of tort actions
and of criminal actions are not completely parallel, i.e., no loss of liberty and
no social stigma is involved in tort liability, many of the procedural safeguards
provided criminal defendants are not afforded tort defendants. Third, the
law enforcement function of punitive damages8 3 tends to supplement and
support the criminal law. This position was taken in Wangen v. Ford Motor
Co., in reference to which the court stated:
The law giving exemplary damages is an outgrowth of the English love of liberty
regulated by law. It. . . encourages recourse to and confidence in the courts of
law by those wronged or oppressed by acts or practices not cognizable in or not
sufficiently punished by the criminal law. The latter law must be uniform as to
persons and acts, must fix a maximum and minimum punishment on this basis, and
cannot alwavs be adjusted to particular circumstances of atrocity which occasion-
ally occur.
The Wangen court went on and quoted language in Kink v. Combs 5 as
reflective of the court's belief that punitive damages are a valuable and effec-
tive tool in the control of human conduct and an aid to the criminal law.
[W]hatever shortcomings the award of punitive damages may have,.., it has the
effect of bringing to punishment types of conduct that ... almost invariably go
unpunished by the public prosecutor.... Certainly, the criminal law seldom
reaches an assault and battery case. By allowing punitive damages the self-interest
of the plaintiff will lead to prosecution of the claim, while the same self-interest of
the plaintiff would lead him to refrain from instituting a criminal action at his own
expense. Punitive damages serve not only the aggrieved victim of an assault, but
also society, for by this device, a quasi-criminal action is prosecuted, when ordi-
narily it would not be prosecuted at all. The multiple-damage suits countenanced
by our statutes recognize the principle that certain types of violations will not be
prosecuted unless the injured parties' judgment is fattened by the equivalent of
punitive damages. These are civil actions (e.g., antitrust suits) where the public
interest is served by the incentive given to private litigation.8
81. Id. at 382.
82. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 278, 294 N.W.2d 437, 448 (1980); 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 522 (2d ed. 1899); K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2,
at 27 (1980).
83. See text accompanying notes 51-54 supra.
84. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 280, 294 N.W.2d 437, 448 (1980) (quoting Luther v. Shaw,
157 Wis. 234, 238-39, 147 N.W. 18, 20 (1914)).
85. 28 Wis. 2d 65, 80-81, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (1965).
86. 97 Wis. 2d 260, 280, 294 N.W.2d 437, 449 (1980).
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C. Theoretical Incompatibility
A second line of attack on the allowance of damages in strict products
liability cases argues that the two doctrines are theoretically incompatible.
Some commentators have argued that strict liability and punitive damages will
not mix since a punitive damages claim is based on allegations of a high level
of misconduct on the part of the defendant, while a strict products liability
claim is not concerned with the manufacturer's actions but instead focuses on
a product's defectiveness.87
One problem with the incompatibility theory is that in a strict liability
action the plaintiff's burden of proving fault has been eliminated for the pur-
pose of establishing liability for compensatory damages. Fault, however,
remains an integral part of the strict products liability action in the sense that
fault is implicit in the notion of a defective product.88 Put differently, the
manufacturer or seller is "at fault" for placing into the stream of commerce a
product that, by reason of its defectiveness, does not satisfy the standards of
safety and quality that society deems acceptable. 89 Fault then is defined as
failure to meet a standard imposed by society. "As a liability doctrine de-
signed to compensate product accident victims for their actual losses, strict
tort theory has never purported to delimit the remedies that might be appro-
priate if a plaintiff's accident is attributable to some aggravated fault of the
manufacturer. "90
A second weakness of the incompatibility argument is that once the
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for his strict liability claim, it would
be a simple matter to allow him to make a supplementary showing of the
aggravating conduct necessary to justify an award of punitive damages.9 '
Thus, a two-tiered inquiry is required: first, the plaintiff must prove that the
product is defective; second, the plaintiff must independently show that the
defendant engaged in conduct sufficiently culpable to give rise to liability for
punitive damages. Until the plaintiff can establish that the defendant is liable
for compensatory damages caused by an unreasonably dangerous product,
there can be no award of punitive damages.92
Finally, the incompatibility argument fails to take into account that puni-
tive damages have been allowed in cases involving causes of action based on
strict principles of liability such as nuisance, negligence per se, defamation,
87. See Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1268 (1976)
(Professor Owen addresses and effectively refutes this argument); Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products
Liability, 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 300 (1972). This argument will hereinafter be called the "incompatibility argu-
ment."
88. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (4th ed. 1971). See also Comment,
Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability: Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 38
OHIO Sr. L.J. 883, 887 (1977).
89. See Comment, Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability: Butaud v. Suburban Marine &
Sporting Goods, Inc., 38 OHIO Sr. L.J. 883, 887-88 (1977).
90. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1269 (1976).
91. See Drake v. Whan-O Mtfg. Co., 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
92. Igoe, Punitive Damages: An Analytical Perspective, TRIAL, Nov. 1978, at 48, 52.
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and implied warranty in the sale of drugs.93 Thus, there is no sound basis upon
which to argue that punitive damages are inherently incompatible with the
doctrine of strict products liability.94
D. Policy Issues
While there may not be an inherent incompatibility between the doctrine
of punitive damages and strict products liability, mere compatibility is not a
compelling justification for allowing punitive damages awards. Because of the
distinctive characteristics of the doctrines of strict products liability and puni-
tive damages, 95 the practical consequences of the commingling of the two
doctrines have caused great concern to many commentators.9 The beneficial
effects of punitive damages must outweigh any negative effects before use of
the doctrine in the strict liability context would be justified. 97
The policy arguments generally mustered by defendants break down into
four categories: (1) the punishment and deterrence functions of the punitive
damages doctrine are not needed in the strict products liability context; (2)
those functions would not be effective in this area; (3) potential multiple
punitive damages awards would cause undesirable economic damage to defen-
dant manufacturers; and (4) undesirable social consequences would follow
from mixing the doctrines. Each of these arguments deserves consideration.
1. Functions of Doctrine Unneeded
Two factors are generally cited in support of the argument that the
punishment and deterrence functions of punitive damages are not needed in
products liability cases. First, compensatory damages are said to fulfill those
functions. Because large numbers of plaintiffs may potentially recover com-
pensatory damages under strict liability actions, and since compensatory
awards have grown larger, manufacturers argue that the costs of paying these
claims or insurance premiums will deter them from engaging in culpable con-
duct.98
Although there is some truth to this argument, it does not follow that all
manufacturers will be deterred. Any manufacturer who believes that his or
her profits will outweigh the expenses of litigation and claims payments will
not be deterred. "Some [manufacturers] may think it cheaper to pay damages
or a forfeiture than to change a business practice." 99 For those entities, the
93. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1270-71 (1976).
94. Contra, Snyman, The Validity of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 44 INS. COUNSEL J.
402 (1977).
95. The doctrine of strict products liability is normally invoked by an individual and there is often the
potential of numerous plaintiffs. The doctrine of punitive damages often involves large monetary claims and is
most often invoked in cases in which the defendants have engaged in outrageous behavior.
96. See, e.g., Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Outline, 11
FORUM 57 (1975); Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products Liability, 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 300 (1972).
97. See generally Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., - Minn. -, - 297 N.W.2d 727, 740-41
(1980); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 283-98, 294 N.W.2d 437, 450-57 (1980).
98. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 285-86, 294 N.W.2d 437, 451 (1980).
99. Id.
[Vol. 42:771
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
prospect of paying punitive damages might well deter them, since they lose
the profitability of their misconduct.'0
The second aspect of the argument that punitive damages are not needed
is based on the existence of state and federal regulation of product quality. It
is argued that because of this regulation and the threat of statutory civil or
criminal penalties, manufacturers are already deterred from engaging in the
type of behavior upon which liability for punitive damages is based.' O' Three
basic weaknesses cripple this line of attack. First, as the Wangen court noted,
not all manufacturers are subject to the extensive regulation that this argument
assumes.' 2 Second, the present political climate portends an era of deregula-
tion. If such deregulation occurs, there would be no effective deterrent
beyond the good faith of the manufacturers. Third, the argument assumes that
governmental agencies will zealously and vigorously enforce regulations and
pursue violators. As noted earlier, governmental bodies are often hindered by
economic, political, and practical restraints in enforcing the laws and regula-
tions of society.'0 3 Furthermore, emphasis on such vigorous enforcement of
regulations could lead to greater harm to innocent manufacturers because of
constant harassment for minor noncompliance. Finally, this argument fails to
take into account the breakdown of the deterrent effect on those manufac-
turers that consciously weigh the cost of noncompliance and find that the
potential profit far outweighs the potential sanctions.
2. The Doctrine's Goals Are Unachievable in the Products Liability Cases
The opponents of punitive damages in a products liability case have also
contended that the functions of punishment and deterrence cannot be
achieved because the costs will simply be covered by insurance or passed on
to the public. ' The first assumption of this argument, that insurance can be
purchased to cover any punitive liability, may be at least partially invalid-a
number of insurers now decline to permit such coverage.' 5 In addition, a
number of states have refused to allow such coverage on the grounds that it
would be against public policy. ' 6
A second weakness of this argument is its failure to deal with the com-
pensatory and law enforcement functions served by punitive damages. The
prospect of a sizable punitive damages award may entice a plaintiff to sue
when he otherwise would have been discouraged because his probable com-
pensatory damages would be outweighed by litigation expenses. Thus, prod-
ucts that cause minor damages to numerous victims can be exposed and
forced from the market.
0 7
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See text accompanying notes 51-54 supra.
104. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 285, 294 N.W.2d 437, 451 (1980).
105. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT, Analysis § 120, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,748 (1979).
106. Id. See also Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 287 n.13, 294 N.W.2d 437, 452 n.13 (1980).
107. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 288, 294 N.W.2d 437, 452 (1980).
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Economic reality also conflicts with the second assumption of this argu-
ment-that costs will simply be passed on to the public. No doubt some costs
will be passed on to the public. However, in our competitive free market
system, any company that consistently increases the price of its products to
offset punitive damages liability would eventually price itself out of the mar-
ket. More responsible manufacturers would be able to keep costs down since
they would not be faced with soaring insurance rates or payment of large
punitive damages awards.'8
Finally, the deterrent effect of potential punitive damages is demon-
strated daily. The recent actions by Proctor & Gamble, Inc., to withdraw a
highly successful product from the market and to issue warnings and recall
orders may stem in some measure from a desire to avoid punitive damages.'09
Other such examples, though less publicized, support the position that puni-
tive damage awards may be a deterrent."
3. Undesired Economic Impact
Judge Friendly vividly articulated the third major policy attack. His
dictum in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc."' has become the rallying
point for the opponents of punitive damages awards in products liability
cases. He stated in part:
The legal difficulties engendered by claims for punitive damages on the part of
hundreds of plaintiffs are staggering. If all recovered punitive damages in the
amount here awarded these would run into tens of millions.... We have the
gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive damages in such a multi-
plicity of actions throughout the nation can be so administered as to avoid over-
kill....
[A] sufficiently egregious error as to one product can end the business life of a
concern that has wrought much good in the past and might otherwise have con-
tinued to do so in the future."
Thus, Judge Friendly's dictum has led to dire predictions of economic ruin for
manufacturers hit with punitive damage liability.
At present it appears that Judge Friendly is a much better jurist than
prophet. Professor Owen has stated that "the threat of bankrupting a manu-
facturer with punitive damages awards in mass disaster litigation appears to
be more theoretical than real."" 3 Since Professor Owen's research, other
studies have documented his conclusion. The Interagency Task Force on
108. Because the size of a punitive damages award should be based upon the amount of money needed to
meet the goals of the punitive damages doctrine, the award should be large enough to make the defendant's
activity unprofitable.
109. In addition to removing the Rely Tampon from the marketplace, the manufacturer ran a media
campaign to educate the public to the potential danger. New York Times, Sept. 23, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
110. Note the recent recall of cribs by Bassett Furniture Industries. Bassett voluntarily agreed to modify
crib models that allegedly had caused the strangulation deaths of six infants. 7 CPSLR 933 (1979).
111. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
112. Id. at 839, 841.
113. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257, 1324-25 (1976).
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Product Liability has noted that there have been few cases with punitive
damages awards.14 Additionally, a spokesman for the Insurance Services
Office (ISO) has stated, "The overall amount of punitive damages has not been
sufficiently significant to warrant rate adjustments as a result." "5 Finally, the
Analysis to Section 120 of the Model Uniform Products Liability Act states:
"While many product sellers have expressed great concern about the econom-
ic impact of punitive damages, the 'ISO Closed Claims Survey' suggests that
the number of cases in which such damages are imposed is insubstantial.,41
6
The Wangen court also took note of the lack of substantiation of manufac-
turers' dire predictions.1 7
Should the manufacturers' predictions prove true, judicial controls
presently exist that can avert the crippling effects of a multiplicity of huge
punitive damage awards. Courts seem willing to use the tool of remittitur, "8
and evidence of prior awarded claims could be submitted to show that there is
no need for a large punitive award." 9
4. Undesirable Social Consequences
Two additional consequences of punitive damage awards, also articu-
lated by Judge Friendly, 2 0 have been offered as reasons to prohibit punitive
awards. First, it is contended that punitive damages awards will serve to
punish only innocent shareholders. The Wangen court quickly dispensed with
this argument by noting:
[T]he loss of investment and the decline in value of investments are risks which
investors knowingly undertake, and investors should not enjoy ill-gotten gains.
There is a public interest in encouraging shareholders and corporate management
to exercise closer control over the operations of the entity, and the imposition of
punitive damages may serve this [purpose]. ' 2
114. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILrrY: FINAL
REPORT VII-77 (1977).
115. Id. (quoting an Insurance Services Office Press Release, Aug. 17, 1977, that called for the exclusion
of punitive damages from liability policies).
116. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,748 (1979) (citing ISO Closed Claims Survey at 183).
117. 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294-96, 294 N.W.2d 437, 455-56 (1980).
118. E.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979). See Owen, Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1320-21 (1976).
119. This approach has been adopted by the MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT § 120(B)(7),
44 Fed. Reg. 62714, 62748 (1979), which states:
(B) If the trier of fact determines that punitive damages should be awarded, the court shall
determine the amount of those damages. In making this determination, the court shall consider:...
(7) The total effect of other punishment imposed or likely to be imposed upon the product seller as
a result of the misconduct, including punitive damage awards to persons similarly situated to the
claimant and the severity of criminal penalties to which the product seller has been or may be sub-
jected.
See also Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1319 (1976).
120. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
121. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 291, 294 N.W.2d 437, 453-54 (1980). But see Jones,
Corporate Governance: Who Controls the Large Corporation?, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1261 (1979) (pointing out the
divorce of shareholder ownership from control and the marked trend toward management control).
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The second undesirable consequence is that punitive damages are a wind-
fall to the plaintiff and that the first plaintiffs to be awarded judgments may
reap huge awards while later plaintiffs may come up empty-handed. Yet a first
plaintiff is the one who should receive large punitive damages awards in most
cases because he takes the greatest risk-that is, of being unable to establish
that the defendant manufactured or sold a product that was unreasonably
dangerous. Should he win, however, those who come after the first plaintiff
can build on his success. Moreover, because he is first, the first plaintiff
perforce incurs the greatest transaction costs. Thus, the punitive damages
award would fulfill its compensatory function by reimbursing the first plaintiff
for the increased costs of litigation and would fulfill its law enforcement
function by operating as an incentive to bring private actions.'2 Additionally,
plaintiffs generally have no right to punitive damages,' 3 and who receives the
awards is irrelevant to fulfilling the punishment and deterrent functions of the
punitive damages doctrine.'24
IV. THE DEFENSES
As more jurisdictions expressly recognize the compatibility of the puni-
tive damages doctrine and the strict products liability doctrine, pressure will
mount for recognition of per se defenses to punitive damages awards. Three
such "defenses" have already surfaced in the few reported cases dealing with
punitive damages awards in strict products liability cases. 25 For purposes of
discussion these asserted defenses will be labeled the "compliance" defense,
the "industry custom" defense, and the "corporate acquisition" defense.
A. Compliance with Federal Standards as a Per Se Defense
In recent cases defendants have argued that compliance with a federal
regulatory or safety standard'precludes an award of punitive damages.'26 The
compliance defense is based on two theories, and defendants argue that either
theory affords a complete defense to punitive damages liability. First, because
the defendant has complied with the applicable regulation or standard, it is
contended that he could not have been acting with reckless disregard of the
rights of others. Compliance thus precludes, as a matter of law, "a finding of
that guilty state of mind which is a necessary prerequisite to a punitive
damages award."127 Second, if the defendant complied with a federal standard
or regulation, it is argued that the imposition of punitive damages would
constitute an inconsistent state law that has been preempted by the federal
122. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 289-93, 294 N.W.2d 437, 453-54 (1980). See text accom-
panying notes 49-54 supra.
123. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 3.4(A) (1980).
124. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 291-92, 294 N.W.2d 437, 454 (1980).
125. The discussion of these three defenses includes some but not all of the arguments upon which
defendants have relied.
126. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., - Minn. 297 N.W.2d 727, 733-35 (1980).
127. Id. at __, 297 N.W. 2d at 733.
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legislation. Thus, imposition of punitive damages would violate the suprem-
acy clause of the United States Constitution.
128
The Gryc court extensively examined the compliance argument and
found both of its theories lacking. The same conclusions were also recently
reached in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 29 In rejecting the first aspect of the
compliance defense, these courts pointed to the error in focusing upon the
defendant's conduct rather than his mental state.30 Punitive damages are
awarded only when the plaintiff has shown sufficient mental culpability. It is
possible to comply with regulatory standards and still be acting in reckless
disregard of the rights of others. A defendant may have duties in addition to
those prescribed by regulation, 3' and knowing disregard of those duties could
constitute the recklessness and indifference to the safety of others that would
make a punitive damages award appropriate.'
32
Second, regulations and safety standards are often outdated,'
33 invalid,134
or designed to serve only as minimal standards. 3 5 Rapidly changing tech-
nology makes many regulations obsolete soon after they are promulgated.
This is evident from the periodic changes that many regulations undergo. 36 If
a plaintiff can introduce evidence to show that a standard is invalid or that a
regulation was not intended to cover a specific situation, then compliance
should not be a defense.
Finally, allowing manufacturers to rely upon compliance with a regula-
tion as a per se defense to punitive damage liability partakes of the wisdom of
allowing the fox to guard the chicken coop. Numerous safety standards and
regulations are adopted as a result of industry influence. 137 These standards
are often modeled after private safety standards that were designed to protect
the industry rather than the public. 38 Thus, the duty of care they embody may
be lower than the duty society requires from the industry.
139
The preemption theory of the compliance defense requires a case by case
analysis to determine whether Congress intended to preempt the imposition of
punitive damages when the regulation was created. 140 There may be situations
in which Congress has used its powers expressly to exclude state laws or to
preclude punitive damages awards.' 4' In such situations punitive damages
128. Id. at __ , 297 N.W. 2d at 735.
129. 485 F. Supp. 566, 576-87 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
130. Id. at 583. See Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., - Minn. 297 N.W.2d 727, 733-35
(1980).
131. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566, 584 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 579-80.
134. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., - Minn. 297 N.W.2d 727, 734 (1980).
135. Id. at - 297 N.W.2d at 736.
136. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566, 579-80 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
137. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., - Minn. ., _ 297 N.W.2d 727, 734 (1980). See also
Igoe, Punitive Damages: An Analytical Perspective, TRIAL, Nov. 1978, at 48, 52-53.
138. See note 137 supra.
139. See Igoe, Punitive Damages: An Analytical Perspective, TRIAL, Nov. 1978, at 48, 52-53.
140. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
141. See generally K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 6.2 (1980).
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would be prohibited. A punitive damages award would also be precluded if
the imposition of punitive damages made it impossible for the defendant to
comply with federal legislation. 142 Punitive damages awards, however, do not
have such an effect, for punitive damages awards operate as an incentive for a
manufacturer to meet or go beyond the standards set in federal legislation.
Absent explicit or inevitable conflict, the preemption analysis must proceed
to a determination of whether Congress intended to displace coincident state
regulation in a given area. 143 Such congressional intent is shown either when
the legislation explicitly states that the authority conferred by it is exclu-
sive,' 44 or when, a preemptive intent is implied. The Gryc court quoted
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota 45 for its expression of the key
factors to use in determining whether Congress has, by implication, pre-
empted a particular area so as to preclude state attempts at dual regulation.
The factors include:
(1) the aim and intent of Congress as revealed by the statute itself and its legislative
history .... (2) the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme as authorized
and directed by the legislation and as carried into effect by the federal administra-
tive agency,... (3) the nature of the subject matter regulated and whether it is
one which demands "exclusive federal regulation in order to achieve uniformity
vital to national interests," ... and ultimately (4) "whether, under the circum-
stances of [a] particular case [state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 46
Few pieces of congressional product safety legislation would be
hampered by allowing punitive damages awards in effect to place a higher
duty on a manufacturer. The punitive damages remedy is not the type of
inconsistent state law that Congress normally seeks to preempt.' 47 Since
many federal regulations set minimum standards,' 48 it would not be impos-
sible for a manufacturer to take steps both to avoid the possibility of punitive
damages and to comply with a federal standard. Many of the major pieces of
federal legislation explicitly leave intact the various forms of liability at com-
mon law. 149 While the preemption aspect of the compliance defense may be
available in a few cases, it appears that in most cases there would be no
conflict between federal law and the imposition of punitive damages. Courts
accordingly should reject such an argument.
142. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
143. Gryc. v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.- Minn. ... 297 N.W.2d 727, 735 (1980).
144. Id.
145. 447 F.2d 1143, 1146-47 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
146. - Minn. - - 297 N.W.2d 727, 735 (1980).
147. Id. at __, 297 N.W.2d at 736.
148. Id.
149. E.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2051-2081 (West 1967 & Supp. 1980). Section
2074(a) states: "Compliance with consumer product safety rules or orders under this chapter shall not relieve
any person from liability at common law or under State statutory law to any other person."
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B. Compliance with Industry Custom
In Maxey v. Freightliner Corp.,5 0 the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law,
held that compliance with industry custom in the design of truck fuel systems
precluded an award of exemplary damages. 5' The court of appeals affirmed
the district court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which had struck
down the jury's $ 10,000,000 punitive damages award.'52 The district court had
stated that "adopting a design common to all manufacturers and millions of
vehicles for over thirty years is a sufficient effort at safety to preclude a
finding that Freightliner acted with an intent which approximates a fixed
purpose to bring about this injury." 53
The industry custom defense suffers from two major weaknesses. First, it
focuses on the defendant's conduct instead of the defendant's mental state.
As noted earlier, it is the mental state of the defendant that is the basis for an
award of punitive damages.'-4 While a defendant may offer evidence of com-
pliance with industry standards to negate the allegation that his conduct in
designing a defective product was accompanied by a culpable mental state,
it is the province of the jury to decide if the defendant acted in good faith.' 55
As stated by Judge Johnson in his Maxey dissent, "The question of whether
exemplary damages are ever appropriate against a manufacturer who has
complied with industry custom becomes to me the question whether society
will ever be served by deterring manufacturers from complying with industry
custom.' 1
56
The second weakness of the industry custom defense is that it could
allow "an entire industry to consciously disregard the rights and welfare of
others and thereby insulate itself from any liability for exemplary
damages." '57 Allowing such a defense serves to defeat all of the goals of the
punitive damages doctrine. While the cost of liability for compensatory
damages may induce some manufacturers to design safer products, it is more
likely that such costs will be figured into the product price throughout the
industry. If the manufacturers were subject to punitive damages awards, they
would face liability designed to sting and could be prompted to design safer
products. 58
It is too early to determine the extent to which the industry custom
150. 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980).
151. Id. at 399.
152. Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 964 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
153. Id. Both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion in the court of appeals noted that the district
court applied an improper standard for the award of exemplary damages. 623 F.2d 395, 405 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980)
(Johnson, J., dissenting opinion).
154, K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 3.1(A) (1980). See text accompanying note 23 supra.
155. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 3.1(A) (1980).
156. Maxey v. Freightiner Corp., 623 F.2d 395, 405 (5th Cir. 1980) (Johnson, I., dissenting opinion)
(emphasis added).
157. Id.
158. Id. See also Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 374 (6th Cir. 1978) (Keith, J., dissenting
opinion).
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defense may be adopted by other courts, but it is evident that it has significant
drawbacks. The defense fails to focus on the mental state of the defendant,
instead looking to the defendant's conduct, and grants a conclusive defense.
No matter how culpable the defendant is, as long as he has complied with the
custom of his industry, he will be immune from punitive damages liability.
This defense would appear to be available even if the entire industry had
intentionally disregarded the rights of the public by continuing to design a
dangerous product when economical and safe alternative designs were avail-
able.
When viewed in light of the functions of the punitive damages doctrine,
the industry custom defense makes little sense. Allowing the defendant to
rely upon the misconduct of others as a defense to his own misconduct
ignores the goals of punishment and deterrence. If a plaintiff can show that the
defendant had known that his product was defectively designed, that it had
caused injuries, and that safe alternative designs could have been developed,
there may be a real need to deter this defendant and the others in the industry.
In such a case the custom of the industry does not conclusively show that the
defendant has not intentionally or recklessly disregarded the rights of others.
Additionally, in such a case there may be an increased need for the compen-
satory and law enforcement functions of the punitive damages doctrine. The
incentive of a possible windfall recovery may encourage a potential plaintiff to
undertake the difficult tasks of proving that the product was unreasonably
dangerous. Thus, a better approach, and one that courts will most likely
follow, is to make compliance with industry custom merely a factor in the
determination of the defendant's mental state."9
C. Change in Corporate Ownership
In Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp.,'60 a possible defense based upon
change in corporate ownership began to emerge. One of the key factors noted
by both the court of appeals and the district court for denying punitive
damages was the fact that the defendant had been acquired by another cor-
poration. It was found that the new owner had demonstrated greater concern
for the consuming public and had purged itself of any preexisting mis-
conduct. 161
The suit in Drayton was brought after a child was severely burned when a
bottle of Liquid-Plumr spilled over her face. Evidence established that
Liquid-Plumr contained a solution of approximately twenty-six percent
159. See Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., - Minn. - , , 297 N.W.2d 727, 731 (19S0). The
Gryc court noted that the textile industry in the United States was not producing flame retardant flannelette at
the time defendant produced the material involved in the case. The entire industry could have used flame
retardant chemicals, however, "if only the textile mills had so desired." Thus, while the defendant had com-
plied with the custom of the industry, the Gryc court did not allow this to preclude an award of punitive
damages.
160. 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978).
161. Id. at 366.
[Vol. 42:771
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
sodium hydroxide, commonly known as lye. Evidently, defendant's product
was safer than any other liquid drain cleaner sold at the time, although the
industry practice had improved by the time of trial and the defendant's suc-
cessor had begun producing a safer product.' 62
It was also established that this and like products were widely used
throughout the United States at the time of the accident. Liquid-Plumr was
advertised as safe and consumers were encouraged to purchase and use the
product.163
The court of appeals chose to uphold the district judge's finding of com-
pensatory liability on the narrow ground of breach of express warranty. Thus,
the court did not address the issue of punitive damages in the context of the
strict liability or implied warranty claims. The court acknowledged the trial
court's statement that "[a]s a general rule punitive damages are disfavored in
the law absent evidence of willful or wanton conduct by the defendant or the
clear need for the imposition [of] a deterrent."64
The court noted that the trial court, in denying punitive damages, relied
upon the evidence of (1) improving industry practices and (2) the fact that the
defendant had been acquired by Clorox Corporation. The district court had
felt that these factors eliminated any need for a deterrent to future miscon-
duct. The court also noted the district court's conclusion that the Clorox
Corporation demonstrated greater concern for the consuming public than had
its predecessor and had purged itself of any preexisting misconduct. 65
The dissenting opinion rejected the majority's conclusion and noted that
the acquisition of the defendant corporation by Clorox Corporation should
not immunize the successor corporation from punitive damages. 66 Thus, a
debate has been initiated over what role the later acquisition of a corporate
entity should play in the determination of punitive damages liability.' 67 Three
162. Id. at 374.
163. Id. at 385.
164. Id. at 365.
165. Id. at 366. The majority opinion can be read to mean that a corporate acquisition will only be a defense
to a punitive damages claim when (1) there is a showing of improving industry practices; and (2) the new
corporate owner has purged itself of preexisting misconduct.
166. 591 F.2d 352, 374 (6th Cir. 1978).
167. What effect a later corporate acquisition should have on liability for compensatory damages has led to
the development of the "successor corporation" doctrine. This doctrine holds that the corporation purchasing
the assets of a dissolved corporation is not liable for any claims against the dissolved corporation. There are
exceptions to this rule, and the rule and its exceptions have been stated:
Where one corporation sells or transfers all of its assets to another corporation, the latter is not liable
for the debts and liabilities of the former unless (1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to such
assumption, (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the two corporations, (3) the
purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation, or (4) the transaction is
entered into fraudulently to escape liability for debts.
Fegan, Successor Corporations and Strict Liability in Tort-A Convergence of Two Opposing Doctrines, 69
ILL. B.J. 142, 142 (1980). Courts have had a difficult time wrestling with what effect corporate dissolution
should have on strict products liability claims for compensatory damages. Some courts have adhered to the
common law rule, while others have either tried to broaden the exceptions or departed from the rule completely.
If a court decides that a corporation is not liable under this doctrine for compensatory damages, then that
corporation could not be liable for punitive damages. If, however, a corporation is found to fall within one of the
exceptions to the rule or if the court abandons the rule, the court must still determine what effect the corporate
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possibilities exist: (1) the later acquisition could act as a per se defense to
punitive damage claims; (2) it could be held to be irrelevant and excluded
entirely from consideration; or (3) it might simply be a factor in determining
the amount of the award.
Allowing a later corporate acquisition to act as a per se defense to liability
fails to take into account the fact that the punitive damages doctrine focuses
on the defendant's mental state at the time of the accident.'3 If the plaintiff
can show that the defendant acted in reckless disregard of the rights of others,
then the defendant should be liable for punitive damages. Later acts cannot
serve to eliminate the culpability that existed at the time of the injury to the
plaintiff. Therefore, a later corporate acquisition cannot logically serve as a
per se defense to punitive damages claims.
While the above analysis indicates that a later acquisition should not be a
factor in determining liability in the first instance, it does not lend support to
the position that such a fact is irrelevant and should be excluded from con-
sideration in awarding punitive damages. Instead, a later acquisition should
be considered in determining the amount of the punitive damages award. Due
regard should be given to the effect of a corporate acquisition on each of the
functions of the punitive damages doctrine. 69 The need for the punishment
function in this situation is questionable. There could be, however, a great
need for the compensatory and law enforcement functions of punitive
damages. Likewise, the deterrent function might be needed if the successor
corporation has continued to market the unreasonably dangerous product or if
other manufacturers are marketing similar products. As stated in the Drayton
dissent:
Punitive damages are needed in cases such as this to put lawless corporations on
notice that profitable but highly dangerous products cannot be marketed in the
expectation that they will cause injuries to a few persons who can be cheaply
compensated. It is only when the profit is taken out of the manufacture of haz-
ardous substances that future horrifying injuries such as the one here can be
averted. 170
It is too early to predict whether manufacturers will press the corporate
acquisition defense. Because the majority decision in Drayton did not rest
solely on the corporate acquisition defense, Drayton may be construed as
weak support for that argument. It can be hoped that courts will choose to
allow a corporate acquisition to be simply a factor in determining the amount
of the punitive damages award.
acquisition will have on punitive damages liability. The scope of this Comment does not permit a detailed
examination of the successor corporation doctrine. For further reference see Fegan, Successor Corporations
and Strict Liability in Tort-A Convergence of Two Opposing Doctrines, 69 ILL. B.J. 142 (19S0); Annot.,
Products Liability: Liability of Successor Corporation for Injury or Damages Caused by Product Issued by
Predecessor, 66 A.L.R.3d 824 (1975).
168. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
169. See text accompanying notes 19-38 supra..
170. 591 F.2d 352, 374 (6th Cir. 1978) (Keith, J., dissenting opinion) (citation omitted).
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V. CONCLUSION
Each of the arguments advanced for repudiating the doctrine of punitive
damages in strict products liability cases can be refuted. Mixing the two
doctrines, however, can pose serious problems. Courts must use their in-
herent powers to protect defendants from the problems caused by a multi-
plicity of lawsuits. If the courts fail to impose sufficient structural safeguards
in this area, legislators will be quick to step in and provide relief.'
7
'
The defenses advocated thus far, while having inherent appeal, are not
adequate substitutes for a case by case analysis of the defendant's culpability.
These defenses would at times serve only to defeat the functions of the puni-
tive damages doctrine. Thus, they should not, as a matter of law, be allowed
to exculpate the defendant.
Punitive damages awards serve valuable functions. Administered wisely,
these awards will serve to benefit society. Courts should embrace the chal-
lenge of applying punitive damages awards in strict products liability cases.
Richard D. Schuster
APPENDIX *
STATES CONSIDERING PUNITIVE DAMAGES AwARDs
IN STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILrY CASES
Alaska:
Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979). Punitive damages
awarded, but on appeal award was reduced to a maximum of $250,000 in
this case.
Arizona:
D'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1977). Punitive
damages issue was submitted to jury but jury did not award punitive
damages. On appeal, the submission of the punitive damages issue to the
jury was upheld.
California:
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1967). The appellate court upheld a punitive damages award of $250,000.
The punitive damages award was not tied to any specific theory of lia-
bility.
Barth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306
(1968). Punitive damages issue was submitted to the jury but jury did not
171. Structural safeguards are needed, especially to deal with situations involving numerous plaintiffs and
the possibility of huge awards. See Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV.
1257, 1295-99 (1976).
* Current as of February 1981.
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award punitive damages. On appeal, the submission of the punitive
damages issue to the jury was upheld.
District of Columbia:
Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The court of
appeals upheld the directed verdict for the defendant on the issue of
punitive damages.
Georgia:
Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1980). The
court of appeals upheld the judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the
defendant on the issue of punitive damages.
Illinois:
Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 253 N.E.2d 636 (111. App. 1969). A punitive
damages award of $10,000 was upheld.
Kansas:
Boehm v. Fox, 473 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1973). The punitive damages
award was upheld.
Cantrell v. Amarillo Hardware Co., [1980 Current Decisions Binder]
Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 8583 (Kan. S. Ct., No. 50,140, Dec. 1, 1979). A
punitive damages award of $18,500 was upheld.
Minnesota:
Wagner v. International Harvester Co., 611 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1979). The
court of appeals upheld the trial court's refusal to allow the plaintiff to
amend his complaint to raise the issue of punitive damages.
Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., - Minn. -, 297 N.W.2d 437
(1980). The Minnesota Supreme Court found that compliance with a
federal safety standard did not preclude liability for punitive damages and
upheld a punitive damages award of $1,000,000.
Abel v. J.C. Penney Co., 488 F. Supp. 891 (D. Minn. 1980). The district
court noted that punitive damages could be awarded in a strict products
liability case.
Missouri:
McIntyre v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 575 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1978). The
trial court vacated a jury's award of punitive damages. The court of
appeals refused to reach the punitive damages issue because it held that
the plaintiff had failed to make a meritorious case for compensatory
damages.
Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. App. 1978). A punitive
damages award of $460,000 was upheld on appeal.
New York:
Ostopowity v. William S. Herrell Co., 157 N.Y.L.J. 21 (1967)
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Westchester Co.). A punitive damages award
was upheld.
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Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). The
court of appeals reversed an award of punitive damages due to insuf-
ficient evidence.
Hafner v. Guerlain, Inc., 34 A.D.2d 162, 310 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1971). The
reversal of a jury's award of punitive damages was affirmed on appeal
since the court found that there was insufficient evidence to support even
the award of compensatory damages.
Oklahoma:
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979). The
defendant was held strictly liable for damages caused by radioactive
material. The defendant was also held liable for punitive damages.
Ohio:
Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975). The court of
appeals reversed the trial court's granting of a motion for judgment n.o.v.
for the defendant on the issue of punitive damages.
Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978). The court of
appeals upheld the district judge's denial of punitive damages in a bench
trial.
Pennsylvania:
Thomas v. American Cytoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa.
1976). The court granted the defendant's motion for a judgment n.o.v.
on the issue of punitive damages.
Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973). The court of
appeals reversed the district court's refusal to submit the issue of puni-
tive damages to the jury.
Tennessee:
Johnson v. Husky Indus., Inc., 536 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1976). The court of
appeals reversed an award of punitive damages.
Texas:
Newding v. Kroger Co., 554 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). The
appellate court upheld the trial court's decision to grant the defendant's
motion for a judgment n.o.v.
Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980). Defen-
dant's compliance with industry practices was a per se defense to a
punitive damages claim.
Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973). The court
of appeals upheld the district court's refusal to submit the issue of puni-
tive damages to the jury.
Wisconsin:
Drake v. Wham-O Mfg. Co., 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974). The
district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's
claim of punitive damages.
Simmons v. Atlas Vac Mach. Co., 475 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
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The district court held that under Wisconsin law a punitive damages
claim should not be dismissed at the pleading stage of the action.
Kirschnik v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., 478 F. Supp. 842
(E.D. Wis. 1976). The district court held that punitive damages are not
available in actions based on negligence or strict liability.
Walburn v. Berkel, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Wis. 1976). The district
court held that punitive damages are not allowed under negligence or
strict liability claims in Wisconsin.
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980). The
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that punitive damages could be recovered
in a strict products liability action.
